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Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment†
L. SONG RICHARDSON*
ABSTRACT
Much of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is premised upon a profound
misunderstanding of the nature of suspicion. When determining whether law
enforcement officers had the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a “stop and
frisk,” courts currently assume that, in any given case, the presence or absence of
reasonable suspicion can objectively be determined simply by examining the
factual circumstances that the officers confronted. This Article rejects that
proposition. Powerful new research in the behavioral sciences indicates that
implicit, nonconscious biases affect the perceptions and judgments that are integral
to our understanding of core Fourth Amendment principles. Studies reveal, for
example, that many people regard ambiguous actions performed by non-Whites as
suspicious, but regard Whites’ performance of those same actions as innocuous.
Empirical evidence also demonstrates that officers vary in their ability to overcome
implicit biases. Utilizing the behavioral realism framework, this Article considers
whether courts should supplement their objective, fact-centered approach to
stop-and-frisk cases with one that is more officer-centric. Rather than treat
reasonable suspicion as something that either is or is not objectively provoked by a
given case’s facts, this Article explores whether courts should place a heavy
emphasis on each officer’s “hit rate”—the rate at which an officer has successfully
detected criminal activity when conducting stop and frisks in the past. This move,
combined with a more robust articulation requirement, may better protect Fourth
Amendment norms.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that provocative new research in the mind and behavioral
sciences can transform our understanding of core Fourth Amendment principles.1
Recent research in the field of implicit social cognition—a combination of social
psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience2—demonstrates that
individuals have implicit (nonconscious) biases that can perniciously affect the
perceptions, judgments, and behaviors that are integral to core Fourth Amendment
principles. Drawing from recent implicit social cognition research and prior work,3
this Article attempts to solve a conceptual puzzle that continues to stymie courts
and Fourth Amendment scholars. How can the “reasonable suspicion” standard
promote efficient policing—policing that protects liberty against arbitrary intrusion
while simultaneously promoting effective law enforcement?
The reasonable suspicion standard attempts to strike a delicate balance between
individual privacy rights and law enforcement needs. This standard serves law
enforcement interests by permitting officers to act on their suspicions of criminal

1. This Article utilizes the behavioral realist approach, which argues that judges should
not base their theories of human behavior on a purely conceptual, a priori process but rather,
on the best empirical scientific evidence that exists. For a summary of this approach, see
Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006).
For recent scholarship utilizing this approach, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on
Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1063, 1064 (2006) [hereinafter Kang & Banaji, Fair Measures]; Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic
Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality:
Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2007); Justin
D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilt by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not
Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between
a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and
Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2009); see also Janice Nadler, No Need to
Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s consent jurisprudence should incorporate findings from the psychology of
compliance).
2. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A Future History of Implicit Social Cognition and the
Law (UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 09-26, 2009) [hereinafter Kang & Lane,
Future History], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458678.
3. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035 (2011).
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activity even in the absence of probable cause. However, in order to prevent
arbitrary police actions, courts impose an articulation requirement that obliges
officers to justify the intrusion by stating the facts—not mere hunches—that led
them to feel suspicious of the individual’s ambiguous behaviors. Courts then
review these facts to determine whether they give rise to a reasonable inference of
criminality.
Ultimately, the standard fails to protect against unjustified encroachments upon
individual liberty because it treats suspicion as an objective concept. Courts assume
that it is possible to objectively determine whether people are acting suspiciously.
They also assume that only people who are behaving suspiciously will be accosted
by the police and restrained in their freedom to walk away.4 This assumption is
crucial to the efficacy of the safeguards against arbitrary policing offered by the
reasonable suspicion standard.
This Article makes the case, however, that the assumptions driving Fourth
Amendment stop-and-frisk jurisprudence are flawed; they are based upon a critical
misunderstanding of the nature of suspicion. Implicit social cognition research
demonstrates that implicit biases can affect whether police interpret an individual’s
ambiguous behaviors as suspicious. For instance, studies repeatedly reveal that
people evaluate ambiguous actions performed by non-Whites as suspicious and
criminal while identical actions performed by Whites go unnoticed.5 The current
operation of the articulation requirement does not ameliorate the problem because
an officer will likely be unaware that nonconscious biases affected his or her
interpretation of ambiguous behavior. Thus, an officer who acts on his suspicions
can easily point to the specific facts that he believes made him feel suspicious
without even realizing that implicit biases affected how he interpreted the behavior.
“Arrest efficiency,”6 or hit-rate data, provides evidence of these biases. Arrest
efficiency refers to the rates at which the police find evidence of criminal activity
when conducting a stop and frisk. When available, these data consistently
demonstrate that the hit rates are lower for non-Whites than for Whites, or that the
rates are at least equal. For instance, in Minnesota, a 2003 report conveyed that the
hit rates for finding contraband were 11.17% for Blacks and 23.53% for Whites.7 In
2010, in New York City, the hit rates for finding contraband were 1.89% for Blacks
and 2.42% for Whites.8 Although the hit rates for Whites were higher than for
Blacks, Blacks were stopped and frisked far more often than Whites.9

4. This paraphrases language from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968), the seminal
Supreme Court decision that created the reasonable suspicion standard.
5. See infra notes 23−34 and accompanying text.
6. This phrase is borrowed from Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An
Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context
of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821 (2007) [hereinafter Gelman et al.,
NYPD Analysis].
7. MINNESOTA STATEWIDE RACIAL PROFILING REPORT: ALL PARTICIPATING
JURISDICTIONS
22
(2003),
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/irp/racialprof/aggregate%20report%2092303.pdf.
8. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK STATISTICS 2009 AND
2010, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Stop_and_Frisk_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
9. In 2009, Blacks comprised 53% of those stopped and frisked while Whites were only
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Implicit social cognition research demonstrates that while implicit biases are
ubiquitous, their magnitude and effects on judgments vary both across individuals
and across situations. Hence, officers are not equally proficient at determining
whether ambiguous behaviors actually denote criminality. Accounting for these
differences in officers’ abilities can help ameliorate the current shortcomings of the
reasonable suspicion standard.
In order to promote efficient policing and safeguard individuals against the
effects of implicit biases, this Article contemplates a judicial refocus of the
reasonable suspicion standard, one that does not solely assess whether an individual
is acting suspiciously (the current fact-centered approach). Rather, this Article
evaluates whether courts should also weigh an officer’s skill at judging the
criminality of ambiguous behavior by examining “police efficiency” data—the rate
at which the individual officer finds evidence of criminality when conducting a
stop and frisk (the officer-centric approach). Under this new approach, police
efficiency would play a central role in a court’s determination of the reasonableness
of a Fourth Amendment seizure. Additionally, this Article explores whether
broadening the scope of the articulation requirement by requiring officers not only
to state the factual basis for the stop, but also the relationship between their training
and experience and the facts that led to the stop will better effectuate Fourth
Amendment norms.
My argument unfolds in three parts. Part I introduces the science of implicit
social cognition and examines its relevance to core Fourth Amendment principles.
Part II scrutinizes the reasonable suspicion standard and exposes its weaknesses.
Part III draws from implicit social cognition research to reconceptualize the
reasonable suspicion standard. It ends by considering some of the benefits and
shortcomings of this new approach.
I. THE SCIENCE
The science of implicit social cognition studies nonconscious mental
processes.10 These are processes that occur outside of conscious awareness and that
operate largely without conscious control.11 Decades of research demonstrate that
people’s feelings, perceptions, decision making, and behaviors are influenced by

stopped and frisked 9% of the time. Id. When researchers studying the stop and frisk
practices of the NYPD controlled for the racial composition and crime rates of
neighborhoods as well as arrest rates, they found that stops of Whites were more likely to
lead to an arrest than stops of either Blacks or Hispanics. Gelman et al., NYPD Analysis,
supra note 6, at 820. They also found that “for the most frequent categories of stops—those
associated with violent crimes and weapons offenses—blacks and Hispanics were much more
likely to be stopped than whites . . . .” Id.
10. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 1−3 (1999)
(describing evolution of social cognition); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,
Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 144
(2004) (same).
11. See Kang & Banaji, Fair Measures, supra note 1, at 1064
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these automatic processes.12 The idea that individuals have conscious control over
all of their actions and judgments has been described as naïve.13
Implicit social cognition research demonstrates that people have nonconscious
reactions to others that can negatively influence their behaviors.14 These implicit
biases15 begin when people categorize others both consciously and nonconsciously
by race, gender, or a host of other socially relevant categories. Categorization
triggers implicit stereotypes and attitudes.16 Stereotypes refer to “the general
inclination to place a person in categories according to some easily and quickly
identifiable characteristic such as age, sex, ethnic membership, nationality, or
occupation, and then to attribute to him qualities believed to be typical of members
of that category.”17 An attitude is “an evaluative disposition—that is, the tendency
to like or dislike, or to act favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or
something.”18 Researchers believe that implicit stereotypes and attitudes originate
from “the deep influence of the immediate environment and the broader culture on
internalized preferences and beliefs.”19
What is surprising about implicit stereotypes and attitudes is that they can and
often do conflict with an individual’s genuine and consciously held thoughts and
feelings.20 For instance, implicit social cognition research demonstrates that most
individuals of all races, including Blacks, have implicit biases against Blacks that
have behavioral consequences. This is not surprising since in our culture, Blacks,
particularly young black men, are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and dangerous.21

12. KUNDA, supra note 10, at 266.
13. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 1, at 946.
14. KUNDA, supra note 10, at 266; see also Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989) (“Automatic processes involve the unintentional or spontaneous
activation of some well-learned set of associations or responses that have been developed
through repeated activation in memory. They do not require conscious effort and appear to be
initiated by the presence of stimulus cues in the environment.” (emphasis added)).
15. The phrase “implicit bias” refers to “discriminatory biases [favorable or unfavorable]
based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes.” Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 1, at
951.
16. KUNDA, supra note 10, at 266.
17. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976) (quoting Henri Tajfel, Social and Cultural Factors in Perception,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 423 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1969)).
18. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 1, at 948.
19. Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit
Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 112
(2002).
20. Kang & Lane, Future History, supra note 2, at 8.
21. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876
(2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by
social psychologists for almost 60 years.”); Sophie Trawalter, Andrew R. Todd, Abigail A.
Baird & Jennifer A. Richeson, Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of Selective
Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008) (“There is overwhelming
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Problematically, implicit biases can affect behaviors in ways that individuals are
unaware of and often unable to control. Some of these behavioral effects will be
discussed next.22 The discussion will center around race and, in particular, the
effects of implicit biases on the treatment of Blacks for two reasons. First, race
continues to play a significant role in police-citizen interactions. Thus, any
conversation about stop-and-frisk practices would be incomplete without a
discussion of race. Second, understanding the influence of implicit social
cognitions on police behavior complicates the discussion of race and policing. The
typical arguments that the disproportionate policing of Blacks can be explained
either by conscious racial bias on the part of the police or by the assumption that
Blacks engage in more ambiguously criminal behavior does not withstand scrutiny.
One behavioral effect of implicit bias is that it influences how individuals
interpret the ambiguous behaviors of others.23 An early study documenting the
effects of negative racial stereotypes on the interpretation of behavior involved
white subjects evaluating an ambiguous physical contact between two men.24 The
researchers had the subjects watch a video of two men having a heated discussion.
The subjects were unaware that the men depicted in the video were actually actors
following a script. At one point in the video, one man shoves the other, and the
subjects had the option of rating this behavior as horsing around, dramatic,
aggressive, or violent.25 The researchers hypothesized that the race of the men in
the video would affect how the subjects interpreted the ambiguous shove.
They were right. When both subjects in the video were white, only 13% labeled
the contact as aggressive.26 However, when both were black, that number rose to
69%.27 Similar differences in interpretation occurred in interracial scenarios. When
the aggressor (pusher) was white and the victim was black, only 17% of the
subjects interpreted the shove as violent.28 Conversely, when the victim was white
and the aggressor was black, the percentage of subjects who viewed the shove as

evidence that young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and dangerous . . . both
implicitly as well as explicitly.” (citation omitted)); see also Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J.
Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1995); Duncan, supra note 17, at 591.
22. For a fuller discussion, see Richardson, supra note 3, at 2043–52.
23. While this section will discuss findings from studies related to implicit social
cognitions, other social psychological literature also supports these biases. See, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 842−43 (2009)
(noting that “[s]ocial psychology teaches us that our perceptions of fact are pervasively
shaped by our commitments to shared but contested views of individual virtue and social
justice. It also tells us that although our ability to perceive this type of value-motivated
cognition in others is quite acute, our power to perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite
poor.”).
24. See Duncan, supra note 17, at 592.
25. Duncan, supra note 17, at 595.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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aggressive rose to an incredible 75%.29 The researchers concluded that negative
black stereotypes affected the subjects’ interpretation of the ambiguous behavior.30
Other research replicates these findings that the threshold for labeling
ambiguous behavior as aggressive or violent is lower for Blacks than for Whites.31
One of these studies demonstrated that these effects hold true for black perceivers
as well as white.32 In that study, the researchers had black and white sixth-grade
students rate the ambiguous behaviors of individuals in four different scenarios.
Two involved physical contact (a bump in the hallway and poking a student in a
classroom) and two did not (requesting food from another student and taking
another’s pencil without asking).33 The results not only provided “clear evidence
that even relatively innocuous acts by black males are likely to be considered more
threatening than the same behaviors by white males,” but also that the “behavior
ratings by black students reflected the same antiblack bias as those by white
students.”34
A particularly disturbing series of studies relates to “shooter bias.” Shooter bias
refers to research findings that individuals in experimental settings, including the
police, more quickly shoot an unarmed black person than an armed white person.35
In one study, researchers asked subjects to shoot armed individuals and to refrain
from shooting unarmed individuals using buttons labeled “shoot” and “don’t
shoot.”36 The results demonstrated that implicit biases caused individuals to shoot
potentially hostile black individuals more quickly than potentially hostile white

29. Id.
30. Id. at 597.
31. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The
Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 342−45
(2004) [hereinafter Hugenber & Bodenhausen, Ambiguity] (finding that subjects evaluated
the same facial expression as more hostile on a black face than on a white face); H. Andrew
Sager & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children’s
Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 593,
596 (1980) (finding that black and white school-age children rated an ambiguous bump in the
hallway as more aggressive when performed by a black actor rather than a white actor); see
also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) [hereinafter Hugenberg &
Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice] (demonstrating that implicit bias scores predicted how long
it took white participants to judge when a hostile expression on a black face became nonhostile).
32. Sager & Shofield, supra note 31, at 596.
33. Id. at 593.
34. Id. at 596.
35. Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bernd Wittenbrink, The Police
Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317–18 (2002).
36. Id. at 1316; see also B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and
Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 287 (2006) (noting that
split-second decisions limit individual ability to control for racial bias caused by racial
stereotypes).
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individuals.37 Although both civilians and police officers exhibit shooter bias,
evidence exists that police officers perform better than civilians do.38
The effects of implicit biases are not limited to the interpretation of ambiguous
behaviors, but can also affect how individuals interpret ambiguous facial
expressions. In one study, researchers created brief movie clips in which a
computer-generated face changed from unambiguously happy to unambiguously
hostile.39 They then asked subjects to determine when the expression changed from
happy to hostile.40 Subjects with higher implicit bias scores more quickly
interpreted a black individual’s ambiguous facial expression as hostile than those
with lower implicit bias scores.41 Implicit bias scores had no effect on perceptions
of anger on white faces.42
In a follow-up experiment, the same researchers created movie clips in which a
computer generated expression changed from unambiguously hostile to
unambiguously happy.43 Not surprisingly, individuals with the higher implicit bias
scores interpreted ambiguously hostile facial expressions as lingering longer on
black faces than those with lower scores did.44 Again, the implicit bias score had no
effect on the interpretation of ambiguous emotions on white faces.45
Another behavioral effect of implicit bias of relevance to police-citizen
interactions is “attentional bias.” This phrase refers to research findings that
people’s attention is drawn more quickly to Blacks, especially young black men,
than to Whites.46 While this can occur consciously, it also happens nonconsciously
and automatically.47 Researchers believe that this bias is related to the fact that

37. Correll et al., supra note 35, at 1317–18.
38. Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, Bernd Wittenbrink, Melody S.
Sadler & Tracie Keesee, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the
Decision To Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020–22 (2007) (finding that
officers do not exhibit shooter bias to the same extent as civilians and suggesting that
extensive training explains this result) [hereinafter Correll et al., Thin Blue Line]. For a fuller
discussion, see infra notes 151−53 and accompanying text.
39. Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice, supra note 31, at 640.
40. Id. at 641–42.
41. Id. at 642.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, Ambiguity, supra note 31, at 342−45
(finding that subjects with high implicit bias scores were more likely to categorize an
ambiguous individual as black as opposed to white when the expression was unambiguously
hostile versus happy).
46. Trawalter et al., supra note 21, at 1324.
47. Eberhardt et al., supra note 21, at 881, 883, 885−87 (finding that research subjects,
primed with crime-related words or photographs below the level of conscious awareness,
were drawn to black faces earlier and for longer time periods than to white faces).
Researchers have also found that individuals’ motivations can nonconsciously affect visual
perceptions, causing individuals to interpret ambiguous figures in a manner consistent with
their desires. See Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want To See: Motivational
Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 612 (2006).
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people nonconsciously and automatically find black men threatening.48 This
hypothesis is strengthened by neuroscientific findings that people show more
activation of the amygdala, a portion of the brain associated with fear, when
viewing faces of black men versus white men.49 It is notable that conscious racial
bias does not predict attentional bias.50 What is predictive is how strongly the
individual nonconsciously associates Blacks and danger.51
These behavioral effects of implicit bias have implications for police-citizen
interactions, especially those initiated by the police in order to investigate
potentially criminal behavior. In Terry v. Ohio,52 the Supreme Court sanctioned
police investigations of individuals based on nothing more than an officer’s
“reasonable suspicions.” The problem is that implicit biases may cause police
officers to pay more attention to Blacks than to Whites and to interpret the
behaviors of Blacks as suspicious more readily than the identical behaviors of
Whites. This leads to inefficient and arbitrary policing. Part II will discuss the
reasonable suspicion test and its shortcomings.

48. Trawalter et al., supra note 21, at 1324.
49. See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman, Ahmad Hariri, Johanna M. Jarcho, Naomi I.
Eisenberger & Susan Y. Bookheimer, An fMRI Investigation of Race-Related Amygdala
Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCI. 720
(2005). The strength of amygdala activation correlates with implicit bias scores related to
racial attitudes. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Kevin J. O’Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sumie
Funayama, J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Performance on
Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCI. 729, 730−33 (2000). Researchers found stronger amygdala responses when they
presented the pictures of black faces subliminally. William A. Cunningham, Marcia K.
Johnson, Carol L. Raye, J. Chris Gatenby, John C. Gore & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Separable
Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 809
(2004) (finding that the stronger reactions were correlated significantly with scores from the
Implicit Association Test (IAT)—a test which reveals implicit biases); see also Allen J. Hart,
Paul J. Whalen, Lisa M. Shin, Sean C. McInerney, Hakan Fischer & Scott L. Rauch,
Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli,
11 NEUROREP. 2351 (2000) (demonstrating that subjects showed greater amygdala activation
to outgroup faces); Andreas Olsson, Jeffrey P. Ebert, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Elizabeth A.
Phelps, The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 SCI. MAG. 785,
785−86 (2006) (demonstrating that humans more readily show a fear response to outgroup
members); Damian Stanley, Elizabeth Phelps & Mahzarin Banaji, The Neural Basis of
Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 165 (2008) (noting that
amygdala activation is associated with fear); cf. Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske,
Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype
Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56 (2005) (demonstrating that amygdala activation to outgroup
members is not inevitable). Researchers have also found that a variety of physiological
responses occur when Whites are exposed to Blacks, including sweating, increased heart rate,
facial twitches, and increased eye blink. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM.
PSYCHOL. 181, 183 (2005).
50. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 21, at 884–85.
51. Nicole C. Donders, Joshua Correll & Bernd Wittenbrink, Danger Stereotypes Predict
Racially Biased Attentional Allocation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1328, 1332
(2008).
52. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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II. THE DOCTRINE
The reasonable suspicion standard was first articulated in Terry v. Ohio.53 In
Terry, Officer McFadden became suspicious of two individuals who appeared to be
casing a joint in preparation for a daytime robbery.54 Acting on his suspicions, but
without probable cause, Officer McFadden stopped the individuals and frisked
them for weapons.55 He found a concealed weapon on Terry and arrested him.56
The Supreme Court held that probable cause was no longer the gold standard
governing when officers could seize and search individuals. Rather, in recognizing
that it was “deal[ing] here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
57
beat,” the Court introduced a lower standard, reasonable suspicion, to regulate
stops and frisks that were less intrusive than full-blown searches and arrests. With
this new standard, the Court intended to give officers the flexibility to investigate
potential criminal activity in myriad situations while simultaneously ensuring that
they were not given free rein to encroach upon justifiable privacy.58
The reasonable suspicion standard allows an officer to act when he observes
“unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous . . . .”59 However, in order to protect
individuals against arbitrary government conduct, the standard prohibits officers
from acting upon “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion[s] or ‘hunch[es].’”60
Rather, officers must gather specific, individualized, and objective facts that
demonstrate a sufficient probability of criminal activity before conducting a Terry
seizure.61

53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 7, 25–26.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (“The essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the
exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order
‘“to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. . . . [sic]”’”
(footnote omitted)).
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
60. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 329 U.S. at 27); see
also United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 2001) (a hunch “cannot
withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107,
1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[i]nchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches” are not
reasonable suspicion (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997)).
61. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (The “level of suspicion is considerably less than proof
of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
346 (1985) (“[T]he requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute
certainty.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“But the essence of all that
has been written is that the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken
into account.”); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence,
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In assessing whether the facts articulated by the officer give rise to a reasonable
inference of criminality, courts use an objective standard, asking “would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”62 This is a
two-step analysis. First, courts determine the facts upon which the officer relied.63 I
will refer to this as the “articulation requirement” because Terry obliges officers to
state the facts that led them to feel suspicious. Next, courts decide whether “these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion.”64 This is a mixed question of law and fact,
and the “issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] . . . [constitutional]
standard.”65
In its review of the facts, a court must give “due weight . . . to the specific
reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience.”66 The Supreme Court justifies this deference on the common sense
belief that “a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions [from
facts] . . . that might well elude an untrained person.”67 Hence, I will refer to this
second step as the “deference requirement.” As will be discussed next, the
operation of implicit social cognitions undermines the articulation and the
deference requirements meant to prevent arbitrary intrusions on individual privacy.
A. Articulation Problem
In order to protect individuals from arbitrary policing, the Terry doctrine
requires officers to base their suspicions on specific and particular facts, not
inarticulable hunches.68 One purpose of the articulation requirement is to prevent
policing based upon stereotypes of criminality.69 However, this safeguard, as
currently understood, is ineffectual because of the operation of implicit social
cognitions.

or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1301 (1982) (a preponderance is
“something just over fifty percent”).
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21−22.
63. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
64. Id.
65. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289
n.19 (1982)).
66. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Professor Jerome Skolnick, a recognized expert on
policing practices, notes that police officers by necessity often develop “symbolic assailants”
in order to identify potential criminals. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 45−46, 217−18 (1966). Often this “symbolic
assailant” is associated with black men. Id. at 49.
67. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699
(“[A] reviewing court should take care . . . to give due weight to inferences drawn from those
facts by . . . local law enforcement officers . . . through the lens of his police experience and
expertise.”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (deference is due to the
“observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer”).
68. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
69. See id. at 12 & n.7, 14 & n.11.
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A Terry stop will occur only after an officer interprets an individual’s
ambiguous actions as suspicious.70 Terry stops are limited to ambiguous behaviors
because if the behaviors were unambiguously criminal, probable cause would exist,
eliminating the need to rely upon the reasonable suspicion standard. The science of
implicit social cognition provides compelling evidence that implicit racial bias can
affect both who will capture an officer’s attention71 and whether an officer will
interpret the individual’s behaviors as criminal.72
In Terry, for instance, Officer McFadden became suspicious when he saw Terry
and another gentleman standing on a street corner during the afternoon in
downtown Cleveland.73 He stated that they just “didn’t look right”74 to him,
although he could not articulate “precisely what first drew his eye to them.”75 “[T]o
be truthful,” he admitted, he just “didn’t like them.”76 Assuming that Officer
McFadden was being truthful,77 implicit bias can explain why the two men, both of
whom were Black, captured McFadden’s attention despite his inability to articulate
why. Only after his attention was drawn to the two men did McFadden observe
ambiguous behavior that he interpreted as indicative of people casing a joint in
preparation for a daytime robbery. Based upon his observations, Officer McFadden
stopped and frisked Terry and found a concealed weapon.78
In order to demonstrate that the stop and frisk was not based upon a hunch,
McFadden articulated the specific and individualized facts that led him to conduct
it. However, this articulation does not safeguard against stops based upon racial
hunches. Because implicit biases are nonconscious, McFadden would be unaware
that race affected not only who captured his attention, but also his interpretation of
the actions he observed. Once he felt suspicious, he could easily point to the
specific facts that he believed made him suspicious without realizing that his
feelings might have been triggered by a racial hunch caused by the operation of
implicit social cognitions. In other words, Officer McFadden would not realize that

70. See McCauliff, supra note 61, at 1310 n.96 (“Criticism of the ‘reasonable suspicion’
standard frequently rests on the concern that ‘temporary seizures for investigation will be
undertaken upon the subjective judgment of police officers and that courts will be reluctant to
second-guess them.’” (quoting LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 73 (1968)).
71. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 23–45 and accompanying text.
73. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. For McFadden’s full testimony, see State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State
of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1387 (1998).
76. State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The
Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, supra note 75, at 1456.
77. Terry’s defense lawyer described Officer McFadden as “a guy that we really liked.
He was straight. One thing about him—as a police officer, he came straight down the line.
You did not have to worry about him misrepresenting what the facts were. He would come
straight down the line, and as a defense lawyer I could appreciate that.” Honorable Louis
Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 727, 729 (1998).
78. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
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if Terry and Chilton had been white, he may not have noticed the behavior or may
have interpreted it as indicative of window-shopping instead of robbery.79
In sum, implicit biases may cause officers not only to pay more attention to
Blacks than to Whites, but also to interpret identical acts differently based upon the
race of the individual performing them. This demonstrates that an officer’s
suspicions are not necessarily based solely upon the ambiguous actions he
observes. Consequently, the articulation requirement does not prevent actions based
upon racial hunches caused by implicit bias.80
B. Deference Problem
A further problem with the reasonable suspicion standard is that courts often
defer to officer judgments of criminality without any criteria for determining
whether deference is justifiable. Instead, courts repeatedly defer to the judgments of
all officers, with no inquiry into the particular officer’s training, experience, and
skill.
Terry mandates that courts give “due weight . . . to the specific reasonable
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.”81 The Court justifies deference on the common sense belief that “a
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions [from facts] . . . that might
well elude an untrained person.”82 Thus, according to the Court, police knowledge
and experience “yield inferences that deserve deference.”83 Yet, courts consistently
fail to determine whether the inferences drawn by the officer conducting the stop
are actually entitled to any weight. Only a review of the particular officer’s
judgments would give courts the information necessary to make this determination.

79. This articulation requirement is open to the same critique made by Justice Marshall
in the peremptory challenge context. In his dissenting opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 (1986), Justice Marshall argued that requiring prosecutors to articulate a
race-neutral reason for their use of peremptory challenges would fail to prevent
discriminatory jury selection practices. He argued:
A prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the
conclusion that a prospective black juror is “sullen,” or “distant,” a
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted
identically. A judge’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to
accept such an explanation as well supported.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, he argued that peremptory challenges should be
abolished. Id. at 107. One could make the argument that the reasonable suspicion test should
be eliminated for similar reasons.
80. Importantly, I am not arguing against an articulation requirement. Rather, I argue
that the articulation requirement should be strengthened. See infra discussion at Part III.B.
81. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
82. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see cases cited supra note 67.
83. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); see also David A. Sklansky,
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT.
REV. 271, 300−01 (critiquing the Ornelas decision for essentially stating “that police officers
should receive as much deference as trial judges”).

1156

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1143

Deference to officer conclusions might be warranted in appropriate
circumstances. After all, whether facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion is
contextual.84 As the Court recognized, “what may not amount to reasonable
suspicion at a motel located alongside a transcontinental highway at the height of
the summer tourist season may rise to that level in December in Milwaukee.”85 It is
impossible to catalogue the myriad factual situations in which officers make
judgments of potential criminality.86 In fact, the contextual nature of the inquiry
explains why seemingly innocent conduct can form the basis of a suspicion that is
reasonable.87
Given the sheer number of situational variations that may give rise to reasonable
suspicions, some deference to officer judgments may be necessary and justifiable
as a matter of institutional competence. With the proper training and experience,
officers may learn to make accurate judgments about when an individual’s actions
denote criminality.88 Furthermore, an appropriately trained and experienced officer
is likely more proficient than the courts at determining whether a particular set of
circumstances is suspicious.89
Furthermore, de novo review may be problematic because judges will inevitably
have different conceptions about what quantum of evidence is sufficient to support
a reasonable suspicion. When 164 judges were asked to quantify how much
evidence they felt was required to sustain a reasonable suspicion, their estimates

84. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (citations omitted) (acknowledging that reasonable
suspicion is a “fluid concept[] that take[s its] substantive content from the particular contexts
in which the standards are being assessed”); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (the limitations
imposed by the Fourth Amendment “will have to be developed in the concrete factual
circumstances of individual cases”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (noting that
“[t]his Cour[t] [has a] long-established recognition that standards of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application” and that “[e]ach case is to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.
86. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 (“[T]hey fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of
the myriad factual situations that arise.”).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (“We noted in Gates, 462
U.S., at 243−44, n.13, that ‘innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing
of probable cause,’ and . . . [t]hat principle applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion
inquiry.”). See generally Eli B. Silverman, With a Hunch and a Punch, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
133 (2007) (describing the contextual nature of suspicion). As the Supreme Court has stated,
whether actions are indicative of “ongoing criminal behavior” or innocent conduct depends
almost entirely on context, and thus, “one determination will seldom be a useful ‘precedent’
for another.” Ornelas, 570 U.S. at 698 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11
(1983)).
88. Officers should also be able to articulate the individualized facts that justify their
suspicions. Hence, I am not arguing that experience and training translate into hunches that
deserve automatic deference. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 25 (2007); Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59
VAND. L. REV. 405 (2006).
89. But see infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (observing that implicit social
cognitions may make officers less proficient than lay people).
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ranged from 50% at the high end to 10% at the low end.90 With these differing
perceptions, it is not surprising that courts reach different results as to whether or
not a reasonable suspicion exists on “strikingly similar” facts.91
Even if judges agreed on the quantum of evidence question, they might still
assign different weights to the historical facts or evaluate them differently, as is
evident from dissenting opinions or reversals on appeal in Terry cases. For
instance, in United States v. Erwin,92 whether or not a reasonable suspicion existed
turned on the court’s interpretation of the defendant’s movements in an airport. The
majority interpreted the defendant’s movements as evasive, while the dissent
attributed the defendant’s circuitous route in the airport to his desire to avoid a
picket line.93
Asking courts to engage in de novo review of an officer’s fact-specific and
contextual judgments of criminality to determine if the officer’s interpretation of
ambiguous facts is reasonable has resulted in a body of cases that is a “hopeless
clutter.”94 As a question of institutional competence, then, some deference to
officer inferences may be appropriate. The problem, however, is that courts have no
criteria for determining when and how much deference to an officer’s judgment is
appropriate. The danger is not only that courts will defer when they should not, but
also that they will fail to defer when they should.
Importantly, I am not arguing against de novo review. Review of officers’
articulations is critically important to ensuring that officers are not basing stops on
illusory or inappropriate criteria. However, blind deference to all police officer
judgments does little to protect against arbitrary policing.
Deference is based on the assumption that all officers have the experience and
training required to give them the qualifications necessary to make judgments of
criminality with some accuracy. There are two problems with this assumption.
First, it is incorrect. Yet, only rarely do courts engage in any serious inquiry into an
officer’s actual training and experience. When they do, they often assume that there
is a relationship between training and experience on the one hand, and the ability to
make accurate judgments of criminality on the other. Second, courts do not account
for individual differences in officer abilities to make accurate inferences of
criminality. Rather than engaging in any analysis about how much weight an
officer’s inferences are due, courts typically defer to most officers, not just those
who may merit it. These two points are discussed next.

90. Forty-nine quantified it at 30%, thirty-three quantified it at 20%, twenty-four at 10%,
twenty-one at 40%, and twenty-three at 50%. McCauliff, supra note 61, at 1327–28. The
average percentage for reasonable suspicion was 29.59% out of the 164 judges. Id. at 1332.
91. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that in Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980), the Court found insufficient facts for reasonable
suspicion despite the fact that the case involved “strikingly similar” facts.).
92. 803 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. See id. at 1511 (majority opinion); id. at 1512 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
94. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, supra note 88, at 415.
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1. Training and Experience
Courts often defer to officer inferences of criminality based upon the assumption
that their experiences and training are meaningful. However, they rarely engage in
any serious attempt to think through what types of experience and training are
significant in the reasonable suspicion context. In fact, courts rarely inquire into an
officer’s experience at all. Chief Judge Ginsburg of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia “uncovered no case in which a federal court engaged in a
more searching review of a Terry stop because of a rookie officer’s lack of
experience.”95 Most courts simply equate the status of being a police officer as
connoting the experience necessary to justify deference to the officer’s judgments.
This mistake is exemplified in Terry. The Terry Court viewed Officer
McFadden’s actions as consistent with good police work based upon his
experience.
[McFadden] testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a
detective for 35 and that he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of
downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He
explained that he had developed routine habits of observation over the
years and that he would “stand and watch people or walk and watch
people at many intervals of the day.”96
The Court concluded, “[i]t would have been poor police work indeed for an officer
of 30 years’ experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same
neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.”97 However, this
conclusion only makes sense in hindsight since Officer McFadden found Terry in
possession of a weapon.
Although Officer McFadden’s suspicions concerning Terry’s behavior were
confirmed, the result tells us virtually nothing about Officer McFadden’s
competence as an officer. McFadden’s actions are equally consistent with luck.
McFadden admitted that he had no experience watching people casing joints for
daytime robberies.98 Thus, his suspicions concerning Terry’s and Chilton’s
behaviors were not based upon any prior relevant experience. Furthermore, the
Court had no information concerning any training McFadden had received that was
relevant to his conclusion that Terry was preparing for a daytime robbery.
McFadden’s decision to stop Terry could have been based simply upon his
assumptions about how people casing a joint might act. If this is the case, his
conclusions are not entitled to any weight. His actions only seem consistent with
good police work because his suspicions just happened to be correct on this
occasion. Yet, absent information concerning Officer McFadden’s competence to

95. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Of Hunches and Mere Hunches: Two Cheers for Terry, 4 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 79, 86 (2007).
96. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
97. Id. at 23.
98. See State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The
Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, supra note 75, at 1420.
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make accurate inferences of criminality from ambiguous behaviors, the fact that he
turned out to be right this time is essentially meaningless.
Furthermore, Terry’s and Chilton’s race may have triggered implicit biases that
affected McFadden’s interpretation of their behavior as suspicious. For all the
Court knew, perhaps McFadden had stopped dozens of other black individuals who
“didn’t look right” who turned out to be innocent of any wrongdoing. Without
more information concerning Officer McFadden’s hit rates, it is simply impossible
to determine whether his experiences as an officer were meaningful to his ability to
make accurate judgments of criminality based upon ambiguous facts on this
occasion.
Where the interpretation of ambiguous behavior by non-Whites is concerned,
the relationship between experience (understood as years served on the police
force) and the ability to make accurate inferences of criminality is tenuous at best.
Empirical evidence suggests that officers are more likely to be influenced by
implicit racial bias than civilians are because the nature of officers’ jobs requires
them to think about crime constantly. Compelling research by Stanford
psychologist Jennifer Eberhardt demonstrates that simply thinking about the
concept of crime triggers implicit racial biases in police officers.99 Based upon her
research, she concluded that “[n]ot only are Blacks thought of as criminal, but also
crime is thought of as Black.”100
Furthermore, courts imbue experience with meaning, “notwithstanding the
complete lack of empirical evidence that experience in policing is a good proxy for
accuracy in hunching.”101 In Florida v. Rodriguez,102 for instance, the Supreme
Court concluded that an officer’s suspicions were reasonable because he “had
special training in narcotics surveillance and apprehension.”103 That training
included
40 hours of narcotics training in the police academy and, after being
assigned to the Narcotics Squad, a 5-week course from the Organized
Crime Bureau, which included one-and-one-half to two weeks of
training in narcotic surveillance and drug identification. He had
received further training under the auspices of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and at the time of his testimony he had 18 months’
experience with the airport unit.104

99. Eberhardt et al., supra note 21, at 877−78.
100. Id. at 883.
101. Ginsburg, supra note 95, at 85; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too:
Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion
Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 10 (2010) (arguing that “[a]ny concept of
reasonable suspicion . . . that tolerates massive false negative rates—frequent invasions of
privacy, property, and locomotive rights that ensnare the apparently innocent—is a flawed
conception. The costs imposed on communities and individuals become great, while little in
the way of crime-control efforts is achieved.”).
102. 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 3.
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The mere fact of training is of little probative value when not coupled with any
evidence that the particular training an officer received is related to making
accurate judgments of criminality or that the training helped this particular officer
with his judgments.105 Yet, even without this evidence, courts are encouraged to
allow “officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to
them.”106
An officer’s experience can affect the accuracy of his inferences, but not in the
way courts assume. Counterintuitively, an inverse relationship may actually exist
between experience and accuracy. Police officers often engage in proactive
policing in urban, poor, majority-black neighborhoods. Research demonstrates that
officers who work in urban environments have higher levels of implicit racial bias
than those working in other neighborhoods.107 In fact, one study revealed that
similarly situated neighborhoods are viewed as more disorderly when they are
majority black versus majority white.108 Thus, officers whose primary experience is
based on proactive policing in urban, poor, and majority-black neighborhoods may
have higher levels of implicit bias which can result in them being less accurate than
officers whose primary experience consists of work in other neighborhoods. An
officer’s experience alone, therefore, may be a poor proxy for accuracy.

105. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, Justice Powell referred to
the officer’s experience and training without any discussion of how they related to the
officer’s ability to discern criminal from noncriminal acts. 446 U.S. 544, 563−64 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring). He wrote,
In all situations the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience.
The two officers who stopped the respondent were federal agents assigned to the
Drug Enforcement Administration. Agent Anderson, who initiated the stop and
questioned the respondent, had 10 years of experience and special training in drug
enforcement. He had been assigned to the Detroit Airport, known to be a
crossroads for illicit narcotics traffic, for over a year and he had been involved in
approximately 100 drug-related arrests.
Id. at 564 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975)). Many lower court decisions make the same
mistake. See, e.g., State v. Calmese, No. 1 CA-CR 07-0243, 2008 WL 3863900, at *5 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008) (considering officers’ training, length of time served as a police
officer, and number of stops that led to drug investigations); People v. Prince, No. A114480,
2007 WL 1705658, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 2007) (considering the officer’s thirty-two
years of experience as a police officer); State v. Scheller, No. 4-123/03-1279, 2004 Iowa
App. LEXIS 592, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2004) (referencing the officer’s eighteen
years on the police force); State v. Gonzales, No. A05-2151, 2007 WL 46029, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007) (considering years as a police officer, number of traffic stops, and
number of drug arrests); State v. Long, 303 S.W.3d 198, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)
(considering the fact that the officer had received specialized training in narcotics
investigations); State v. Kehm, 724 N.W.2d 88, 91, 96 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that
the officer’s experience included making “a number of arrests”).
106. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
107. See Correll et al., Thin Blue Line, supra note 38.
108. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004).
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2. Individual Officer Differences
Courts assume that officers are equally proficient at making judgments of
criminality, which explains why most courts do not inquire into an individual
officer’s experience and ability to make these judgments.109 Deference, then, is
based solely upon the belief that because of their experience as officers, they will
be good at making judgments of criminality. While this may be true for some
officers, it is certainly not true of all officers. In fact, empirical evidence
demonstrates that individual differences exist, both in the level of implicit bias an
officer might have as well as in the officer’s ability to make accurate judgments of
criminality.110
Implicit social cognition research suggests that individual differences exist with
regard to both the presence and the strength of implicit bias.111 For instance, in their
review of the results of 600,000 studies testing implicit biases, researchers found
that while both Whites and Blacks show nonconscious preferences for Whites,
Blacks showed a weaker preference than Whites did.112 Furthermore, “personal
standards” can affect the strength of implicit bias.113 For example, self-identified
liberals seem to show “somewhat” weaker implicit bias than conservatives,114
“high-prejudice individuals are more likely than low-prejudice individuals to
activate and apply stereotypic information,”115 and people committed to egalitarian
goals may be able to control implicit stereotype activation better than those who are
not.116 Remarkably, people who are highly motivated to be nonprejudiced may be

109. But see State v. Warren, 718 N.E.2d 936, 938−41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (finding no
reasonable suspicion in part because the officer “never elaborated on his experience”).
110. For a discussion of how quick, intuitive judgments are often wrong because of the
influence of cognitive biases, see Taslitz, supra note 101, at 14−31.
111. See Lorella Lepore & Rupert Brown, Category and Stereotype Activation: Is
Prejudice Inevitable?, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 275 (1997); Margo J. Monteith,
Jeffrey W. Sherman & Patricia G. Devine, Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 72 (1998) (citing Russell H. Fazio, Joni R. Jackson,
Bridget C. Dunton & Carol J. Williams, Variability in Automatic Activation as an
Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1013 (1995)); Bernd Wittenbrink, Charles M. Judd & Bernadette Park, Evidence
for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and Its Relationship with Questionnaire Measures,
72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 (1997).
112. See Nosek et al., supra note 19, at 102, 105.
113. See id. at 106 (citing Gordon B. Moskowitz, Peter M. Gollwitzer, Wolfgang Wasel
& Bernd Schaal, Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through Chronic
Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (1999)).
114. See id. The authors cite to another study that demonstrated “a relationship between
rigidity in thinking, right-wing ideology, and conscious and unconscious attitudes toward a
variety of social groups (i.e., Black, Jewish, poor, gay, and foreign).” Id.
115. Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, Ambiguity, supra note 31, at 342.
116. See, e.g., Leslie R. M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal
Motivation to Control Prejudice on Implicit Prejudice: The Mediating Role of Efforts to
Control Prejudiced Responses, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2004) (finding
that those with internal motivations to be nonprejudiced show decreased implicit biases
compared to those who are only externally motivated); Michael Johns, Jerry Cullum, Tonya
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able to avoid the effects of nonconscious biases on their behavior altogether.117
Finally, exposure and contact with non-Whites also influences implicit biases.118
Empirical evidence further demonstrates that officers differ in their ability to
make judgments of criminality. In one study, two economists studied data from all
highway stops and searches on Florida highways conducted by the Florida State
Patrol from January 2000 to November 2001.119 The authors tested whether
troopers of different races engaged in the same search patterns.120 What they found
“soundly reject[ed] the hypothesis that troopers of different races are monolithic in

Smith & Scott Freng, Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice and Automatic
Egalitarian Goal Activation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1514 (2008); William W.
Maddux, Jamie Barden, Marilynn B. Brewer & Richard E. Petty, Saying No to Negativity:
The Effects of Context and Motivation To Control Prejudice on Automatic Evaluative
Responses, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 32−33 (2005); Gordon B. Moskowitz,
Peter M. Gollwitzer, Wolfgang Wasel & Bernd Schaal, Preconscious Control of Stereotype
Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167
(1999). A related discussion of how individuals whose “cultural orientation . . . prizes
egalitarianism and social solidarity” can affect the interpretation of ambiguous acts. See
Kahan et al., supra note 23, at 841. The authors had 1350 Americans view a videotape of a
high-speed police chase that resulted in the driver becoming a quadriplegic after the police
officer “deliberately rammed [plaintiff’s] vehicle at the end of a high-speed chase, causing it
to flip over an embankment and crash.” Id. at 839. The authors found that “African
Americans, low-income workers, and residents of the Northeast . . . tended to form more
pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court. So did individuals who characterized
themselves as liberals and Democrats.” Id. at 841.
117. Monteith et al., supra note 111, at 73−75 (citing studies).
118. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice
and Stereotypes: The Role of Automaticity and Cognitive Control, in HANDBOOK OF
PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 272 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) (“[L]ongterm immersion in counterstereotypic social contexts may reduce the default accessibility of
stereotypes or enhance the chronic accessibility of counterstereotypes, thereby decreasing the
likelihood of biased automatic judgments and evaluations in the future.”); Cf. Nilanjana
Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of Long-Term
Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members on Implicit Attitudes and
Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 112, 119–20 (2008) (those with a great deal of
prior contact with outgroup members—in this case, gays and lesbians—showed less outgroup
bias regardless of the situational manipulation in the laboratory).
119. Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 141 (2006). The data
consisted of information for “906,339 stops and 8,976 searches conducted by a total of 1,469
troopers.” Of the stops considered, 66.5% were carried out against white motorists, 17.3%
against Hispanic motorists, and 16.2% against black motorists. Id. Of the 8976 searches
conducted, 54.6% were performed on Whites, 23.4% percent on Hispanics, and 22.1% on
Blacks. Id. Slightly over 79% of the searches were unsuccessful. Drugs were the most
common contraband found—15.1% of total searches—followed by alcohol/tobacco (2.1%)
and drug paraphernalia (1.5%). Of the police officers, 76.3% were white, 13.7% were black,
10% Hispanic, 89% were male. White troopers conducted 73% of the stops, 86% of all
searches; black officers conducted 16% of stops and 4.6% searches. Finally, Hispanic
officers conducted 11.4% of stops and 9.5% of searches. Id.
120. Id. at 147. The researchers reweighted the sample so that all troopers faced the same
racial population of motorists. Id. at 140.
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their search behavior.”121 For any given motorist, the average search success rate
for black and Hispanic officers was higher than that of white officers.122 Similar
results were obtained in a study examining the practices of the Los Angeles Police
Department. Researchers found that “[t]he black arrest disparity was nine
percentage points lower when the stopping officer was black than when the
stopping officer was non-black.”123
Professor Max Minzner reviewed the data from the Florida State Police
Department study.124 He found differences among individual officers in their search
success rates. As he put it,
Between January 2000 and September 2001, each [officer] performed a
similar number of probable-cause searches of automobiles: Officer A
conducted eighteen searches, while Officer B conducted fifteen
searches. When Officer A thought he was likely to recover evidence, he
was almost always wrong. Only one of his eighteen searches led to a
seizure—a success rate of 5.6%. Officer B, by contrast, was almost
always right. He recovered evidence in thirteen of the fifteen searches,
for an 86.7% success rate.125
While this evidence relates to probable cause searches, there is no reason to think
that these individual differences would disappear in searches based upon the lower
standard of reasonable suspicion.
Additional evidence confirming individual officer differences comes from
research by Dr. Eli Silverman, Emeritus Professor at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice. His observations led him to conclude that
[l]ike other individuals within the same occupation, police vary in their
ability to make intelligent, intuitive choices. Just as it varies among the
general population, some police are better than others in detecting
patterns from experience. Research and empirical observation amply
demonstrates [sic] that there is a wide range in the ability of police
officers to successfully deploy reasonable hunches in their work. Some
officers, for example, are far better at spotting a hidden gun on a

121. Id. at 147.
122. Id. at 144. Furthermore, for all officers, the average search success rate was highest
against Whites, followed by Blacks, and then Hispanics. For instance, black officers search
about the same percentage of white and Hispanic motorists (.27% and .28%), but their
average success rate against white motorists was much higher than that for Hispanic
motorists (39.4% versus 21.0%). Id. at 145.
123. Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los
Angeles Police Department 28 (Oct. 2008), http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47.
Importantly, however, the researchers assumed that “officers are less likely to engage in
racially biased policing against members of their own race.” Id. This, of course, may not be
the case. See also Billy R. Close & Patrick L. Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement:
Officer Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 263 (2007) (finding
that the hit rates of black and Latino officers were higher than that of white officers).
124. See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV.
913, 914 (2009).
125. Id. at 914−15.
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suspect than are others. They also differ in their fine-tuned abilities to
almost instantaneously decide the right moment to pull or hold the
trigger when faced with unexpected, dangerous, rapidly unfolding
situations.126
In sum, the current operation of the reasonable suspicion standard does not
account for differences in an officer’s ability to judge potentially criminal behavior.
Instead, courts defer to officers’ inferences based upon the unsupported assumption
that experience, which remains undefined in the doctrine, automatically translates
into expertise in interpreting the criminality of ambiguous behavior. This
assumption does not withstand empirical scrutiny.
Does the reasonable suspicion standard have the potential to be simultaneously
more efficient and more protective of individual liberty? Are its current
shortcomings the result of a doctrinal failure to be realistic about the nature of
suspicion and the ability of officers to make accurate judgments of criminality?
Part III considers these questions by proposing and evaluating a new approach.
III. NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
When determining whether officers had the reasonable suspicion necessary to
justify a stop and frisk, courts currently assume that the presence or absence of
reasonable suspicion can be determined objectively simply by examining the
factual circumstances that the officers confronted. The current inquiry is fact
intensive.
Take the Ninth Circuit’s approach in United States v. Sokolow127 as an example.
In that case, the officer provided the following facts as the basis for his suspicion:
(1) that Sokolow had just returned from a three-day trip to Miami, a
well-known source city for drugs; (2) that Sokolow had paid for his
tickets out of a large wad of $20 bills; (3) that neither Sokolow nor
Norian checked any luggage; (4) that during Sokolow’s layover in Los
Angeles he “appeared to be very nervous and was looking all around
the waiting area”; (5) that Sokolow dressed in a black jumpsuit and
wore a lot of gold jewelry; and (6) that Sokolow had his voice on an
answering machine at a phone subscribed to by Karl Herman but was
ticketed under the name Andrew Kray.128

126. Silverman, supra note 87, at 140. See also Albert W. Alschuler, Upside and
Downside of Police Hunches and Expertise, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 115, 117−18 (2007)
(describing the process of chicken sexing where experienced individuals can differentiate
between male and female recently hatched chicks, yet they cannot articulate exactly how they
are able to differentiate); James M. Rosenbaum, Hunches: Too Much Discretion, Not Enough
Control, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 107, 107−08 (2007) (relating the story of an officer on a ride
along with an experienced DUI officer who could determine whether or not someone was
drunk to a high level of accuracy even when the individual did not appear drunk to others).
127. 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1 (1988).
128. Id. at 1417.
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To determine whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable, the Ninth Circuit
divided the facts into “evidence of ‘ongoing criminal behavior,’ on the one hand,
and ‘probabilistic’ evidence, on the other . . . .”129 After analyzing the facts in this
manner, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the officer’s suspicion was
unreasonable.130
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, criticizing it as too formalistic
because it involved “draw[ing] a sharp line between types of evidence, the
probative value of which varies only in degree.”131 The Court acknowledged that
the facts were open to different, yet equally plausible, interpretations. As a result,
the facts did not have “the sort of ironclad significance attributed to them by the
Court of Appeals.”132 However, rather than building from its premise that
antithetical inferences can be made from identical facts133 and rethinking the
reasonable suspicion inquiry based upon this observation, the Court instead
proceeded to conduct its own analysis of the facts and concluded that they did give
rise to a reasonable inference of criminality.134
Yet, it is unclear how the Court reached this conclusion. If the conclusion was
based upon the Court’s own analysis of the facts, it is not obvious why the Court’s
analysis is any more accurate than the analysis conducted by the Ninth Circuit. If
the conclusion was based upon the officer’s reliance on these facts, there was no
evidence presented that the officer had any skill in connecting these facts with
criminality. The officer’s stop could have been based on a lucky hunch. Simply
stating the factual basis of his stop did not give the Court any information upon
which to judge whether the officer’s suspicions were reasonable. Rather, the
reasonableness of the officer’s conclusion seems based upon the fact that evidence
of guilt was subsequently found on the target. This method of analysis fails to
prevent hunch-based policing and does little to provide meaningful review of police
decision making.
Relying upon powerful new behavioral sciences research, this Article rejects the
premise that suspicion is objectively determinable. Suspicion is not something that
either is or is not objectively provoked by a given set of facts. Rather, whether
identical behaviors are interpreted as suspicious can be influenced by the operation
of implicit social cognitions.
My goal in the following two subparts is to think about whether Fourth
Amendment doctrine can effectively address this new insight about the nature of
suspicion. I consider whether it would be beneficial and feasible to shift the
primary focus of the reasonable suspicion analysis from a review of the facts giving

129. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
130. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1423–24.
131. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8.
132. Id.
133. For another example of antithetical inferences, see United States v. Erwin, a case in
which the reasonable suspicion determination turned on the court’s interpretation of the
defendant’s movements in an airport. 803 F.2d 1505, 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 1986). The
majority interpreted the defendant’s movements as evasive, while the dissent attributed the
defendant’s circuitous route in the airport to his desire to avoid a picket line. Id. The evidence
supported both interpretations. Id.
134. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8–11.
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rise to the suspicion to a focus on how proficient the officer conducting the Terry
stop is at inferring criminality. This new officer-centric approach would require
courts to take into account an officer’s hit rate—the rate at which the officer has
successfully detected criminal activity when conducting stops and frisks in the
past.135 In addition, I analyze whether courts should strengthen the articulation
requirement by mandating that officers state how their experience and training
enhanced their ability to judge the criminality of the facts they observed on the
occasion at issue. Under this new officer-centric approach, the court’s attention
would be on officer proficiency rather than on solely attempting to analyze whether
the facts support a suspicion that is reasonable.
A. Officer Hit Rates
Courts currently pay scant attention to officer competence, despite references to
it. For instance, in United States v. Arvizu,136 an officer stopped a driver he
suspected of smuggling illegal aliens. In upholding the Terry stop, the Court found
that it was “quite reasonable that a driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and
failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer might well be
unremarkable in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite
unusual in another (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”137 In
concluding that the officer’s suspicion was reasonable, the Court maintained that
the officer “was entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his
specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants.”138
The Court was on the right track when it focused upon officer competence. An
officer’s training and knowledge may well affect the reasonableness of his
inferences. However, without evidence of how proficient the officer is at making
these judgments, a court cannot meaningfully judge the weight to accord the
officer’s assessment.
At present, as long as officers articulate some objective facts justifying their
suspicions, courts typically defer to their judgments. While some deference in
appropriate circumstances may be justifiable from the perspective of institutional
competence, courts rarely require information concerning an officer’s ability to
make these judgments accurately. Such information is important since suspicion is
not objectively determinable in the face of ambiguous facts. Rather, the
interpretation of ambiguous facts as suspicious is often dependent upon the race of
the individual observed and the officer’s nonconscious racial biases;139 and officers
differ in their abilities to make accurate judgments. Obtaining information about an
officer’s hit rate would provide courts with some information about the officer’s
abilities.140 Under this proposal, then, hit rates would be one factor, albeit an
important one, in the totality of the circumstances analysis.141

135. For an excellent discussion advocating the use of hit rates to increase the accuracy
of probable cause determinations, see Minzner, supra note 124.
136. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
137. Id. at 275−76.
138. Id. at 276.
139. See supra Part I.
140. I am not the first to argue for the use of hit rates in the Fourth Amendment context.
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This proposal leaves a number of questions unanswered concerning hit rates.
First, what should constitute a hit? Surely consensual and noninvestigatory contacts
should not. However, at what point does an encounter become investigatory?
Second, what is the hit rate that courts should consider reasonable? Should there be
a static hit rate that is appropriate for all types of stops? Or, should courts
determine the appropriate hit rate on a case-by-case basis? For instance, perhaps the
reasonableness of the officer’s hit rate should depend upon the scope of the
intrusion and the gravity of the suspected offense.142
While these questions are not answered here, consideration of officers’ hit rates
would have a number of important benefits. For one, it would begin moving the
Terry doctrine beyond the current fiction that the reasonableness of suspicion can
be determined objectively simply by reviewing the facts and circumstances the
officer observed. Furthermore, hit rates would require a court to confront officer
competence explicitly. If an officer has a low hit rate, courts would have to provide
an explanation for why they found his suspicion reasonable despite the low rate,
lending some transparency and accountability to their decisions. Additionally, the
proposal will educate courts about the fallibility of the police in a systematic way.
Presently, courts likely assume that officers are good at making judgments of
criminality because they rarely, if ever, obtain information about the cases in which
officers are incorrect. Through consistent exposure to individual officer hit rates,
courts will have a better sense of officer fallibility, perhaps leading to more realistic
balancing of privacy and security in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally.
Requiring evidence of hit rates might also spark beneficial institutional changes.
If hit rates become important, departments will have to create a system for
collecting officer hit rate data. This will allow departments to track the
effectiveness of officers engaged in proactive policing. Furthermore, this system
will give departments the ability to assess the efficacy of their training programs
because they will be able to track whether officer accuracy increases as a result.
The department will obtain concrete information about the varying proficiencies of
their officers and will have to determine what to do with officers whose hit rates are
too low to pass constitutional muster. Once proficient officers are identified, the
department can begin the process of trying to discover what makes those officers
more effective than others and use this information to improve the performance of
In a recent article, Max Minzner argues that in appropriate circumstances, magistrates
determining the existence of probable cause should consider an officer’s success rates in the
analysis. Minzner, supra note 124.
141. See United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 1 (1988) (“In assessing whether a given set of facts constitutes reasonable
suspicion, we must determine whether the facts collectively establish reasonable suspicion,
not whether each particular fact establishes reasonable suspicion. ‘[T]he totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.’” (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)) (alteration in original)).
142. For discussions about the importance of proportionality to the Fourth Amendment,
see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1120−23 (1998) (discussing Terry’s proportionality principle);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 47
(1991) (stating that “the level of intrusion associated with the police action is the most
important gauge of how much certainty the police must have before they conduct a search or
seizure”).
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the less effective officers. This might entail additional training, partnering less
effective officers with those who are more proficient, or a host of other
possibilities. The benefit of this approach is that courts, by making hit rates
important, will create incentives for departments to increase officer effectiveness
while allowing departments to retain the flexibility to determine how best to
achieve this.
Furthermore, by gathering information about officer proficiency, institutions
may learn to identify the type of person who is more likely to make accurate
judgments of criminality. With this information, departments may be better able to
recruit officers with those characteristics.143
Identifying officers who are not adept at making judgments of criminality is
important for a number of reasons. First, an officer who is not good at making
judgments of criminality based upon ambiguous information will waste time and
resources on unproductive stops and frisks, which is problematic in a time of scarce
resources.
Second, an unproductive officer reduces law enforcement effectiveness by
fostering community resentment and distrust. This officer will infringe upon the
privacy and liberty of many innocent individuals. Of course, the Fourth
Amendment does not require or demand certainty.144 However, the discretion of
officers who are more often wrong than correct should be limited because their
actions are arbitrary. To the extent that this officer’s unsuccessful searches are
concentrated amongst members of a discrete racial group, the perception amongst
the group may be that this particular officer is a “bad” officer—one who
wrongfully and unfairly harasses individuals, even if the officer is acting in good
faith. This does not serve law enforcement interests to the extent that this officer’s
behaviors cause resentment in the community. This resentment will likely lead to
distrust of police in general and make individuals less willing to cooperate with law
enforcement.145
Knowledge of their hit rates may also encourage behavioral changes that have
the potential to reduce the effects of implicit bias.146 Implicit social cognition

143. See L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2012) (exploring the influence of officer
character on judgments of suspicion).
144. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 413 (2005) (Souter, J. dissenting)
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not demand certainty of success to justify a search for
evidence or contraband.”).
145. Jamie L. Flexon, Arthur J. Lurigio & Richard G. Greenleaf, Exploring the
Dimensions of Trust in the Police Among Chicago Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180, 180
(2009) (explaining that when citizens distrust the police they are hesitant to report crimes and
to help with police investigations).
146. Numerous studies demonstrate that implicit biases are malleable. See, e.g., Irene V.
Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002) (reviewing literature testing whether automatic stereotypes are
malleable). Neuroscientific studies also provide evidence of malleability. Patricia G. Devine
& Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in HANDBOOK
OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 76−80 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009)
(citations omitted).
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research demonstrates that while implicit biases are ubiquitous, they are also
malleable.147 It is possible to reduce their effects on behavior.148
If their hit rates matter, officers will be motivated to be more accurate before
conducting a Terry stop. This will likely translate into them gathering more
unambiguous information of criminality than they currently obtain before
conducting a stop. Thus, to the extent that a focus on hit rates changes officer
incentives and motivates them to individuate, it has the potential to reduce the
effects of implicit biases on officer behavior.149
Studies demonstrate that gathering more individuating information about people
can reduce the activation of nonconscious racial stereotypes.150 For instance, in a

147. Blair, supra note 146 (reviewing literature testing whether automatic stereotypes are
malleable); Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away:
The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 828 (2001) (discussing mental imagery studies which demonstrate that stereotypes
are malleable); John T. Jost, Laurie A. Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Jack Glaser & Curtis D. Hardin, The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond
Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and
Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 44–45 (2009); Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair, Motivated
Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY
12, 18 (1999) (stating that “research provides suggestive but not indisputable evidence for the
possibility that people may inhibit the activation of stereotypes in some circumstances”);
Wheeler & Fiske, supra note 49 (demonstrating that amygdala activation to outgroup
members is not inevitable). Evidence of malleability is also found in neuroscientific studies.
Devine & Sharp, supra note 146, at 76−80. In fact, some studies demonstrate that some
people who are low in prejudice may not activate racial stereotypes at all. Kunda & Sinclair,
Motivated Reasoning, supra, at 15−16. One study demonstrated that exposure to positive
examples of outgroup members could reduce implicit biases. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony
G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800
(2001). But see Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited
Malleability of Implicit Racial Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 144–145 (2010) (while
malleability was shown after exposure to counter-stereotypical racial group members, the
effects were weak).
148. For a discussion of the malleability of implicit social cognitions, see Richardson,
supra note 3, at 2054–55.
149. For studies discussing the importance of motivation to reducing implicit biases, see
Patricia G. Devine, E. Ashby Plant, David M. Amodio, Eddie Harmon-Jones & Stephanie L.
Vance, The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations To
Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 (2002) (showing
that people with high internal motivation to be nonprejudiced more effectively controlled
racial bias); Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation To Control Prejudice, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008); Wheeler & Fiske, supra note 49.
150. C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Bodenhausen, Alan B. Milne, Tania M. J. Thorn & Luigi
Castelli, On the Activation of Social Stereotypes: The Moderating Role of Processing
Objectives, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 471 (1997); see also Susan T. Fiske,
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998) (reviewing studies
documenting that individuation reduces automatic stereotyping); Susan T. Fiske, Intent and
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study testing “shooter bias,”151 researchers found that both civilians and police
officers more quickly shot an unarmed black individual than an unarmed white as a
result of implicit bias.152 Intriguingly and unexpectedly, however, officers
performed better than civilians did. Officers were better able to overcome the
effects of implicit bias on their shoot/don’t-shoot decisions, leading researchers to
tentatively conclude that their training to be careful before shooting “may allow
officers to more effectively exert executive control . . . essentially overriding
response tendencies that stem from racial stereotypes.”153
Furthermore, as individuation becomes habitual, it can alter and even eliminate
automatic, nonconscious reactions.154 This can occur because the relationship
between the conscious mind and nonconscious mind is “bi-directional—each level
of mind reciprocally influence[s] the other. . . . This observation means that the
conscious [mind] can, especially over time, gain a measure of control over the
subconscious, though the latter necessarily continues to influence the former.”155
Thus, consciously considering more data can alter nonconscious and automatic
reactions to certain stimuli such as race.
Gathering hit rates will also provide useful information to individual officers.
Officers likely believe they are more proficient at judging criminality than is
actually the case.156 This occurs because stereotypes about criminality can affect
what events are encoded into memory.157 People often have better memories for
events that are consistent with their pre-existing expectations rather than for those
that are not.158
Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC.
JUST. RES. 117, 123−24 (2004) (discussing individuation); Margo J. Monteith, Jeffrey W.
Sherman & Patricia G. Devine, Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 72 (1998) (discussing individuation and citing
studies that demonstrate that “[o]ne factor that strongly influences the likelihood of
individuation is the perceiver’s degree of motivation to form accurate, nonstereotypical
impressions”).
151. See supra notes 35−38 and accompanying text for a discussion of shooter bias.
152. Correll et al., Thin Blue Line, supra note 38.
153. Id.
154. Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the Subconscious in Date
Rape (and Other) Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 177 (2007) (noting that “[t]he
subconscious mind also monitors, and learns from, our own behavior. . . . Your behavior
provides new data for the subconscious, and any behavior repeated often enough to become
habitual will also become part of the subconscious.”).
155. Id. at 174 (citation omitted).
156. Professor Craig Lerner writes, “[a]mong themselves and in informal discussions with
others, police officers insist that their hunches about criminals are often right and that their
‘sixth sense’ proves invaluable in the field.” Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere
Hunches, supra note 88, at 413.
157. Myron Rothbart, Mark Evans & Solomon Fulero, Recall for Confirming Events:
Memory Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 343, 344 (1979); see also Claudia E. Cohen, Person Categories and Social
Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects of Prior Knowledge, 40 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 441 (1981) (describing study in which subjects were more
likely to remember stereotype consistent information).
158. Charles M. Judd & Bernadette Park, Definition and Assessment of Accuracy in
Social Stereotypes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 112 (1993).
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For instance, in one study involving police officers, researchers found that an
officer’s implicit racial stereotypes of criminality caused them to pay more
attention to black faces than to white faces.159 However, this increased attention did
not improve their memories for the black faces they viewed. Rather, officers were
more likely to falsely identify a black face as one they had viewed previously when
that face had more stereotypically black features.160 Officers did not make the same
mistake with white faces.161 The researchers concluded that “though stereotypic
associations led perceivers to look in a particular location, . . . what perceivers were
able to remember was, in part, a function of these stereotypic associations.”162
Thus, because of implicit bias, officers may be more likely to remember situations
in which their suspicions of criminality were confirmed than when they were not.
In fact, counterintuitively, their failed searches may actually solidify their racial
stereotypes as officers think to themselves, “Well, he’s guilty, he just got away
with it this time.”163
Since officers will be required to collect their hit rates, they may learn that their
beliefs about how proficient they are at judging criminality are incorrect. Their low
hit rates may cause concern and surprise, especially for those officers who are
acting in good faith and doing their best to stop only those individuals they believe
are engaged in criminal activity. Additionally, for officers engaged in proactive
policing in urban, majority-black areas, their hit rates may cause them to question
their conscious stereotypes of the relationship between race and crime. At this
point, some officers will be motivated to understand their low hit rates.164 They
may even be more open to information concerning implicit biases. For officers with
high hit rates, they may be able to identify the factors that enable them to achieve
more accuracy in conducting stops and frisks. This information will help police
departments educate and train all officers more effectively.
Because courts will require information in order to contextualize the hit rate, this
proposal retains the articulation requirement. However, its current conception is
anemic. Subpart B discusses the second component of this proposal—a meatier
articulation requirement.
B. Robust Articulation Requirement
Currently, the articulation mandate only requires officers to state the factual
bases for their stops so that courts can determine whether they give rise to a
reasonable suspicion.165 The Terry Court assumed that requiring articulation of the

159. Eberhardt et al., supra note 21, at 887.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 888.
162. Id. at 887−88.
163. This can happen through “subtyping.” KUNDA, supra note 10, at 384. “By allocating
counterstereotypic individuals . . . to a subtype that is considered atypical and
unrepresentative of the group as a whole, one may be able to maintain one’s global stereotype
of the group even though one knows that some group members do not fit the bill.” Id.
164. See infra Part III.C.4 for studies demonstrating the relationship between motivation
and reduction of implicit biases’ effects on behavior.
165. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of the problems with the current articulation
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facts that led officers to feel suspicious would prevent them from acting on mere
hunches. However, this purpose for the articulation requirement is essentially
meaningless since the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion cannot be
determined simply through a review of the facts leading to the stop.166
Additionally, the Court’s focus on articulation has created an unintended
consequence. As put by Judge Kozinski, rather than protecting individuals against
arbitrary policing, the requirement simply “creates an incentive for officers to
exaggerate or invent factors, just to make sure that the judges who review the case
will approve their balancing act.”167 This occurs because courts tend to uphold
Terry stops as long as officers avoid using certain buzzwords related to hunches
such as “intuition” and “instinct.” Hence, police officers “load[] up their testimony
with as many acceptable ‘objective’ pieces of evidence as possible,” as Professor
Craig Lerner found when he examined lower court motions to suppress in Terry
cases.168 He continues,
[t]he judicial insistence that only ‘objective’ criteria can form the basis
for a Terry stop in practice simply rewards those officers who are able
and willing to spin their behavior in a way that satisfies judges. It
rewards articulate officers and penalizes those who are less verbally
facile or who are transparent about their motivations.169
In fact, the articulation requirement has even influenced police training
practices. For instance, the statement of objectives for a Justice Department training
program utilized by a large number of state and local police departments relates
that it is training officers on “how to articulate objective reasons for escalating
stops and searches rather than attributing their actions to mere intuition or
preconceptions.”170
Despite these problems, retaining the articulation requirement may be important
for other reasons. To quote Terry, the requirement of providing hit rates should not
“be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the legitimate
investigative sphere. . . . [C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard
against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon
personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the
Constitution requires.”171 Thus, courts must continue to review the factual basis for
the stop, even when an officer has a high hit rate, to ensure that the officer did in
fact observe the behaviors that led him to feel suspicious. Without a requirement of
articulation, there would be no basis for judging the officer’s credibility. Thus,

requirement.
166. See supra Part II.A.
167. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski,
J., concurring). Federal court Judge Harold Baer also notes that it is easy for officers “to
conform their testimony to the gossamer-like requirements” of reasonable suspicion. The
Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is That Enough? The Irrationality of Police
Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 103 (2007).
168. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, supra note 88, at 441.
169. Id. at 456−57.
170. Silverman, supra note 87, at 147−48 (citations omitted).
171. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
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articulating the factual bases underlying a stop serves accountability and
transparency goals.172
Furthermore, articulation provides courts with the opportunity to determine
whether the stop was based upon inappropriate criteria.173 For instance, the
Supreme Court has determined that consideration of race alone is never an adequate
basis for a Terry stop.174 This should continue to be the case regardless of how high
the officer’s hit rate is.
The question I would like to consider next is whether the current articulation
requirement goes far enough. In addition to articulating the individualized facts that
formed the basis for the officer’s suspicion, perhaps an effective articulation
requirement would also require officers to explain how the facts that led to the stop
relate to their experience and training.
Others have argued that a strong connection between suspicion and the officer’s
training and experience might be critical to legitimizing an officer’s actions.175 For
instance, Professor Eric Miller argues that without this link, officers could be
“policing based on luck.”176 This would not only be “unconstitutional” but would
also “undemocratically require[] randomly selected groups of citizens to sacrifice
their security to satisfy the self-interested law enforcement aims of the

172. Taslitz, supra note 101, at 12; see also Albert W. Alschuler, supra note 126 (offering
“five arguments in support of the requirement of specific and articulable facts”); Taslitz,
supra note 101, at 61−67 (discussing the importance of the articulation requirement).
173. See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering
the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99
(1999) (arguing that the character of the neighborhood should not be considered in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists except in limited circumstances).
174. See, e.g., United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (ancestry is a
relevant factor but not standing alone); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
885−87 (1975) (same). But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Hispanic appearance is, in general, of such little probative value that it
may not be considered as a relevant factor where particularized or individualized suspicion is
required. Moreover, we conclude, for the reasons we have indicated, that it is also not an
appropriate factor.”).
175. As Margaret Raymond has argued, articulation “not only exposes the basis for police
conduct to judicial oversight, but the articulation of precisely what was observed and how it
had meaning in the context of the officer’s experience has educative value. Only then can we
begin to bridge that gap between police perception and community perception of who should
be stopped and why.” Margaret Raymond, Police Policing Police: Some Doubts, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1255, 1264 (1998); see also Alschuler, supra note 126, at 123−24
(“[D]eferring to an officer’s unproven expertise has much in common with deferring to his
hunches. Both practices frustrate the independent review of searches and seizures that the
Fourth Amendment demands.”).
176. Eric J. Miller, The Epistemology of Suspicion (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (“In opposition to the dominant paradigm, I shall claim that suspicion, as an
epistemically rational mental state, connotes a particular attitude on the part of an investigator
towards the available evidence. . . . [A]ny account of rational suspicion requires some
qualitative explanation, one that includes the agent’s understanding of how the available
evidence hangs together. . . . The point is not simply to try to obtain some antecedent
understanding of the probabilities facing a given officer, but to determine how skilled is the
officer given her training and experience.” (footnote omitted)).
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government.”177 Similarly, Professor Andrew Taslitz has argued that articulation
can protect against the police
catching the guilty by pure luck rather than by the reasoned,
individualized decision-making process that the Constitution
commands . . . .
. . . We must catch the bad guys, . . . only when we have ample
justification, rooted in reasonably solid evidence, that a particular
person’s wrongdoing has occurred or that evidence of it will be
found.178
Consideration of an officer’s hit rate alone may not prevent luck-based policing.
For instance, let us assume for a moment that Officer McFadden, the officer
involved in the Terry case, has a high hit rate. Let us also assume he testifies that he
has no experience with and has received no training concerning how people casing
joints for daytime robberies might act.179 A court considering his hit rate alone
might find that it is reasonable to defer to his inference that Terry’s ambiguous
conduct evidenced criminality. However, his lack of training or experience with
this particular type of crime might mean that his stop and frisk, and subsequent
discovery of criminal activity, were based purely upon luck. As a result, it may be
unreasonable for a court to defer to McFadden’s inferences of criminality, despite
his high hit rate. Thus, mandating inquiry into an officer’s training and experience
and how they relate to his suspicions on a particular occasion might be necessary to
prevent luck-based policing. For example, if McFadden had a high hit rate, had
received training about the behaviors that are typically exhibited by individuals
about to conduct a daytime robbery, and testified that the behaviors he observed
were consistent with his training, a court could determine that his stop and frisk and
subsequent discovery of a gun were not the result of luck, but of skill.
A more robust articulation requirement may also lead to beneficial institutional
changes. Currently, there is no uniform training of officers.180 A doctrinal
requirement that makes training an important consideration will create incentives
for departments to be more systematic in ensuring that officers engaged in
proactive policing receive it. Additionally, requiring an officer to disclose how long
he has been an officer is important to contextualize the hit rate. For instance, a
rookie officer may have a 100% hit rate if he has only conducted one stop that
resulted in evidence of contraband. Another officer with only two stops, only one
of which was successful, would have a 50% hit rate. Hence, courts will require

177. Id.
178. Taslitz, supra note 101, at 9−10 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also
id. at 52.
179. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
180. See generally Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
31 (2009) (noting the lack of uniform training standards for police). See also Editorial, The
Truth Behind Stop and Frisk: A Court Needs To Take a Very Hard Look at the Police Tactic,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 3, 2011, at A20 (noting that NYPD officers did not recall receiving training
that covered proper arrest procedures and warnings to avoid racial profiling).
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additional information beyond the hit rate in order to evaluate how much weight it
should be afforded.
In sum, the two prongs of the proposal complement each other. Without
articulation, courts would have no ability to judge the officer’s credibility or to
determine whether the officer was relying upon criteria that should never justify a
reasonable suspicion. And without the hit rate, courts cannot determine how skilled
an officer is at making judgments of criminality, despite his training and
experience. The fact that an officer has received training, even specialized training,
is no guarantee of proficiency. Neither is the length of an individual’s experience as
an officer necessarily probative. Both requirements are necessary to give courts the
tools to differentiate between luck on the one hand and proficiency on the other.181
An inquiry into an officer’s hit rates, coupled with a more robust articulation
requirement, will aid courts in making the determination of when an officer’s
inferences are entitled to weight, and if so, how much. Furthermore, once
articulation is only one component, but not the dispositive component, in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists, officers will likely exercise
more care in determining whether or not to conduct a Terry stop, rather than on
devising ways to conform their testimony to existing doctrinal requirements.182
Both requirements will help reduce unjustifiable and arbitrary encroachments on
individual liberty and privacy.183
In thinking through the benefits of this proposal, it might be useful to think of an
analogy to a situation with which most of us are familiar—a law school. The simple
fact that John Smith completed a class in criminal procedure tells us only that he
received training but conveys no information about his understanding (proficiency).
We test his proficiency by asking him to apply his knowledge (training) in an
exam. His success on the exam then serves as a proxy for his proficiency.
Similarly, the fact that John Smith is a third-year law student (experience) also may
tell us very little about abilities and competence. Rather, we would want some
information about his past performance in order to make an educated judgment
about his future performance. In the law school context, then, we believe that one’s
success rate, most often measured by one’s GPA, serves as a useful though perhaps

181. See Miller, supra note 176, for a discussion of the importance of linking skill to
suspicion in order to prevent policing based upon luck.
182. For a general discussion of the importance of individualized suspicion in the Fourth
Amendment context, see Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We
Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 145 (2010). Another safeguard against post-hoc rationalizations may be to have
officers record their explanations for the stop and frisk before approaching the target, when
time allows. This could be done through a recording device attached to their uniforms.
183. In a recent article, Professor Tonja Jacobi argues that Fourth Amendment doctrine
should “embrace rules that aid screening between innocent and guilty defendants and forego
rules that blur those categories.” Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary
Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 660 (2011). In her view, if the purpose of the
Amendment is to “protect the guilty so as not to intrude on the innocent, rather than the
reverse, then the more accurate and powerful a screening device is, the more reasonable it is.”
Id. at 667. Consideration of an officer’s hit rates in the reasonable suspicion anaylsis would
be one way to protect the innocent more effectively.
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blunt proxy for ability. Finally, even if an individual obtains a high grade on an
exam, without some evidence of his actual knowledge (training) and his years in
law school (experience), we would not be able to determine whether the result was
based upon pure luck. In other words, in law school, we want to consider all this
information. Considering an officer’s hit rates and requiring a more robust
articulation can serve the same purposes.
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court adopted an approach very similar to the
one proposed in this Article that combines hit rates with a more robust articulation
requirement. This occurred in a case involving canine sniffs for the presence of
narcotics.184 By way of background, in United States v. Place, the Supreme Court
held that canine sniffs were not searches because drug-detection dogs only respond
to the presence of illegal substances for which there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy.185 Over twenty years later, Justice Souter rejected the conclusion that dog
sniffs were not searches, basing his argument on evidence that these dogs were
fallible.186 In his view, this crumbled the foundation on which Place rested.187
Building from this premise, the Florida Supreme Court considered the question
of what evidence was necessary for a trial court to meaningfully determine whether
a drug detection dog is “well-trained,” such that its alert suffices to establish
probable cause to conduct a search for drugs.188 The court rejected the premise that
drug dogs were reliable based solely on the fact that they were trained and certified.
Rather, in order for a court to “adequately undertake an objective evaluation of the
officer’s belief in the dog’s reliability as a predicate for determining probable
cause,”189 the court held that the government
must present the training and certification records, an explanation of the
meaning of the particular training and certification of that dog, field
performance records, and evidence concerning the experience and
training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective
evidence known to the officer about the dog’s reliability in being able
to detect the presence of illegal substances within the vehicle.190
Furthermore, the Court required the government to
explain the training and certification so that the trial court can evaluate
how well the dog is trained and whether the dog falsely alerts in
training (and, if so, the percentage of false alerts). Further, the State

184. Harris v. State, No. SC08-1871, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 953 (Fla. Apr. 21, 2011).
185. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“[T]he use of a well-trained narcoticsdetection dog—one that ‘does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view,’—during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests.” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983))).
186. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411−13 (Souter, J. dissenting).
187. See id. For a full discussion critiquing the Court’s approach to drug-sniffing dogs,
see Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent
Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 17(1990).
188. Harris, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 953, at *25.
189. Id. at *2–3.
190. Id. at *4.
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should keep and present records of the dog’s performance in the field,
including the dog’s successes (alerts where contraband that the dog was
trained to detect was found) and failures (“unverified” alerts where no
contraband that the dog was trained to detect was found). The State
then has the opportunity to present evidence explaining the significance
of any unverified alerts. . . . Under a totality of the circumstances
analysis, the court can then consider all of the presented evidence and
evaluate the dog’s reliability.191
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision occurred in the probable cause context and
was based, in part, on the fact that a dog could not be cross-examined. However,
the same reliability concerns exist in situations involving reasonable suspicion
judgments. Furthermore, although officers can be cross-examined, the fact that
nonconscious biases can affect the reliability of their judgments of suspicion limits
the usefulness of cross-examination. An officer will not be aware of the effects of
nonconscious biases on his behavior.
Concrete proposals for the implementation of this proposal are beyond the scope
of this Article. Rather, the point is to highlight the need to think seriously about
how to address the fact that suspicion is not the objective concept the Terry
doctrine assumed that it was.192 What follows are some initial thoughts that can
guide implementation, but further development must await future consideration.
For a starting point, the complete failure to provide hit rate data, absent a
compelling explanation, should result in suppression of the evidence. On the other
hand, a high hit rate alone should be an insufficient basis for a finding a stop and
frisk reasonable because, as discussed above, a high hit rate does not preclude luck.
Hence, courts should require additional information beyond the hit rate in order to
evaluate how much weight it should be afforded. My proposal would mandate
inquiry into an officer’s training and experience and how they relate to his
suspicions on a particular occasion.

191. Id. at *42; see also State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Tenn. 2000) (noting that
probable cause should not be based solely upon a canine’s positive alert but also upon proof
of the dog’s reliability).
192. One intriguing suggestion is to replace Terry stops with random stops of groups of
citizens. In a recent article, Professors Harcourt and Meares argue that the obsession with
individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be abandoned.
Replacing it would be “a new paradigm of randomized encounters that satisfy a base level of
suspicion in order to capture the benefits of both privacy-protection (by ensuring a minimum
level of suspicion) and evenhandedness (by cabining police discretion).” Bernard E. Harcourt
& Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment 4 (John M Olin Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 530 and Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 317,
2010) (emphasis in original), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1665562; see also
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2163−69 (2002)
(arguing that seizures of groups, “classes of people defined by place and time,” would better
protect Fourth Amendment values that the current individualized suspicion analysis).
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C. Concerns and Questions
As with any novel approach, the proposal is not perfect. This subpart addresses
some important concerns and raises some questions for future consideration.
1. Data Manipulation
The most obvious problem is that officers might manipulate their hit rates by
failing to report their unproductive stops. While this concern is not fatal since
officers who are motivated to fabricate can already do so under the current Terry
framework, it must be addressed.
Institutional changes may alleviate some data fabrication concerns. First,
departments could require officers to wear video recording devices while on duty in
order to reduce prevarication.193 Although this would require video storage, current
technologies make this a viable option. Additionally, some cities have installed
video surveillance cameras in neighborhoods that are high in crime.194 Departments
could periodically and randomly review selected videos and compare the findings
to the hit rates reported by the officer in order to deter manipulation. Second, police
chiefs and supervisors may be able to significantly reduce incentives for lying
through the manner in which they frame the need to collect hit rates and by the
policies and philosophies they institute in their departments.195 In whatever way
departments choose to deter the fudging of data, a zero-tolerance policy is likely
crucial. Any officer who intentionally alters his hit rate data must be terminated.
Finally, an example of the type of monitoring necessary to deter manipulation is
already being used at the NYPD, where officers are required to record their stops
and frisks on a special form.196 In order to track officer compliance, the NYPD
instituted an extensive monitoring system.197 Other departments can create similar
systems and learn from the experiences of the NYPD.
Another safeguard against data manipulation will be citizens, grassroots
community groups, public defender offices, and nongovernmental organizations
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Once these groups become
aware that hit rates matter, it is likely that some systematic means of gathering data
from citizens about the stops and frisks they witness or experience will be created.
This database can serve as another source of information about an officer’s hit
rates. If there is a discrepancy between the officer’s reported hit rate and the data

193. For a discussion of the use of body-worn video devices and their cost-effectiveness,
see David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for
Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357 (2010).
194. See, e.g., CHICAGO POLICE DEP’T, CRIME SURVEILLANCE INNOVATIONS IN CHICAGO:
THE HISTORY OF POLICE OBSERVATION DEVICES
(2008),
available
at
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/POD%20Progra
m/POD-History.pdf.
195. James J. Fyfe, Terry: A[n Ex-]Cop’s View, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1231, 1247 (1998)
(citing numerous research studies which conclude that “the major determinant of officer’s
behavior in the streets is the philosophy and policy of their chiefs”).
196. Gelman et al., NYPD Analysis, supra note 6, at 815.
197. Id. at 822.
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collected by other means, this will serve as a red flag that more inquiry into the
officer’s hit rate is necessary. Again, if an investigation reveals dishonesty, the
officer must be fired.
2. Overdeterrence
It is possible that the proposal will result in overdeterrence as officers refrain
from conducting Terry stops for fear of negatively affecting their hit rates.
However, we should be cautious before making this assumption. Officers are
professionals who have incentives to maximize their searches and hit rates. Thus,
rather than refraining, they may instead obtain training to increase their skill in
making stops and frisks. In other words, they may continue to make stops, but
engage in training to increase their hit rates.
To the extent that officers do reduce the number of stops and frisks they
conduct, some caution on their part may be desirable given that many are already
engaging in unproductive stops.198 Furthermore, while we have become
accustomed to the broad discretion police officers now enjoy because of the current
operation of the Terry doctrine, it is worth remembering that, as Fourth
Amendment historian Thomas Davies concludes, “we now accord officers far more
discretionary authority than the Framers ever intended or expected.”199 Depending
upon one’s perspective, the reduction in police discretion to conduct Terry stops
that may result from this proposal is not problematic.
3. Perverse Incentives and Unintended Consequences
While this proposal is likely to spur institutional changes, departments will have
to carefully consider how they handle officers who have consistently low hit rates.
One response to low hit rates may be to transfer the officer to a different location or
to remove him from proactive policing duties altogether. This raises the risk that
officers may purposely lower their hit rates in order to orchestrate a move to a
different neighborhood or department they find more desirable.
Another problem is that focusing on hit rates may lead officers to concentrate
their stops and frisks on certain communities of people based upon a belief that
doing so will be more productive. As Professor Alschuler notes,
Suppose . . . that an officer has reason to believe that stopping one
hundred blacks will, on average, yield six arrests for drug offenses
while stopping one hundred whites will yield only five. If race were
this officer’s only predictor of illegal drug activity and if the officer had
an unlimited number of blacks and whites to stop, she could maximize
the number [of] drug arrests by stopping only blacks. . . .
The economics of proactive policing often encourage the police to
“pile on.” A small perceived disparity in the rate of offending of two
groups can make it economically rational to concentrate enforcement

198. See supra notes 6−9 and accompanying text.
199. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 556, 655−57 & n.299 (1999).

1180

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1143

resources on the group whose investigation appears to yield the greater
payoff in arrests and convictions. The result may be a “multiplier
effect,” a “cop cascade,” or a “race to the black or brown race.” Police
officials whose political incentives encourage them to denounce racial
profiling may have economic incentives to do it. These incentives are
independent of the racial biases that continue to infect American
policing.200
It may well be the case that in an effort to increase their hit rates, officers will focus
their attention on non-Whites or other groups believed to be more actively engaged
in criminal activity. If doing so yields high hit rates, and officers are able to
articulate the factual basis for their stops and how their training and experience
relate to their suspicions, then there are limits to the ability of this proposal to
address this situation. Of course, if proof exists of intentional race discrimination,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause would prohibit such
conduct.201 However, the Supreme Court has made it virtually impossible to prevail
on an equal protection claim.202 Also, officers who understand that race may be a
prohibited factor in certain circumstances may simply lie about what motivated
them to engage in the stop.203 Although this is an important concern, it is not
unique to this proposal because the same concerns exist under the current Terry
doctrine and this proposal is not meant to be a panacea for every possible issue
related to policing under Terry.
One question is whether adoption of the new framework will cause courts to rely
too heavily upon an officer’s hit rate and create de facto immunity for officers with
high hit rates. In other words, courts may fail to carefully review an officer’s
justifications for making the stop because they will be overly influenced by the
officer’s history of successful and productive stops. Thus, the fear is that an officer
who is engaged in prohibited racial profiling and lies about it will more easily get
away with it if he has a high hit rate. If the proposal facilitates racial profiling, then
it will exacerbate a problem that already exists and it may provide a reason to
abandon implementation.
4. Flawed Assumption?
One assumption underlying this project is that hit rates and articulation will
address the problems posed by the nonconsciously biased and inaccurate officer.

200. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
163, 216 (2002).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–
42 (1976) (noting that an equal protection violation requires proof of intentional race
discrimination).
202. See Donna Coker, Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal
Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 844–48 & n.100 (2003).
203. Courts have not barred all consideration of race as a factor in the reasonable
suspicion analysis. See supra note 174; see also I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and
Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 66 n.148 (2009) (noting that some courts have
considered racial incongruity as a factor giving rise to a reasonable suspicion).
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This is an officer who, because he is affected by nonconscious racial biases, will
not be proficient at correctly inferring criminality from the ambiguous behaviors
engaged in by non-Whites.204
However, what if this assumption is flawed? What if the nonconsciously biased
officer can also make accurate judgments of criminality? Although this seems
unlikely given the results of implicit social cognition research, should this
circumstance arise, then the proposal would be no better than the current approach
in preventing the over-policing of non-Whites. This is because the nonconsciously
biased, but accurate, officer is one who is more likely to interpret the ambiguous
behaviors of non-Whites as suspicious while unintentionally interpreting identical
behaviors engaged in by Whites as noncriminal.205
For instance, consider the study described earlier of subjects interpreting an
ambiguous physical contact between two people engaged in a heated discussion.206
A nonconsciously biased officer observing this behavior on the street will be more
likely to view the contact as aggressive and potentially criminal if the individuals
involved are black as opposed to white. As a result, he will stop the black
individuals, but ignore or not even notice the white individuals, despite the fact that
they are engaged in identical conduct. Even if he is proficient at judging the
criminality of this ambiguous contact, he will stop Blacks more often than he stops
Whites. Hence, the result will be the same as if he were a consciously biased
officer who purposefully stops Blacks at higher rates than Whites, assuming that
the consciously biased officer has an acceptable hit rate and hides the fact that he is
engaged in race conscious profiling. Under this proposal, then, the stops made by
both the consciously biased but accurate officer and the nonconsciously biased but
accurate officer would be considered reasonable as long as the hit rate and
articulation requirements are met.
Are both scenarios identical from a normative perspective? Clearly, an officer
intentionally engaged in race-based policing would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. However, is it any better when the officer is doing so nonconsciously? This
Article does not attempt to answer this question. All that can be said for now is that
the proposal is likely no worse than the current situation. At present, courts will
typically defer to the inferences of criminality made by this nonconsciously biased
officer anyway.207 The proposal at least will give courts some information about
officer proficiency, something that is missing under the current approach to
reasonable suspicion cases.
CONCLUSION
Courts and scholars have misunderstood the nature of suspicion. The result is a
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that not only fails to protect individual liberty but
also promotes inefficient policing. This Article draws from important new
behavioral sciences research concerning the effects of implicit biases on

204. I wish to thank Mary Ann Franks and Illeana Porras for this useful framing.
205. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing attentional bias).
206. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text (discussing experiment).
207. One way the proposal would make this situation worse is if the court would not have
deferred but for the presence of a high hit rate.
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perceptions and judgments to challenge the assumption that suspicion is objectively
determinable. It fashions a more realistic conception of suspicion and utilizes it to
consider whether replacing the current fact-centered approach to suspicion with one
that places its emphasis on police efficiency is more faithful to Fourth Amendment
norms.
Additionally, this Article highlights the need to think seriously about
encouraging institutional changes within police departments to address the effects
of implicit social cognitions on officer behavior. Perhaps the important questions
scholars concerned about policing and the Fourth Amendment should be asking
relate to the possibility of structuring police incentives differently. It is my belief
that Fourth Amendment doctrine, as currently understood, is limited in its ability to
correct for the effects of implicit social cognitions. However, it may possible to
rethink this jurisprudence to create incentives for institutional modifications.
Some might imagine that it is naïve to believe that police officers and
departments will change. This assumption is incorrect. Police departments are
already experimenting with new internal structures that have improved police
citizen interactions.208 Furthermore, there is evidence that police officers may be
open to the suggestions contained in this Article. A Los Angeles Police Department
sergeant has written that
The proper way for the courts to deal with hunches is, in my view, to
acknowledge that some officers are possessed with greater intuitive
abilities than others, but then to treat such abilities as an additional
factor in an officer’s training and experience when weighing the
reasonableness of a particular detention. . . . I would not want to live in
a country where an officer was prohibited from acting on his hunches,
but I would be afraid to live in one where he is empowered to act solely
on them.209
My hope is that the preliminary thoughts offered here will serve as a springboard
for more dialogue about how to account for the effects of implicit social cognitions
on police behavior and to urge courts and scholars to gain a better understanding of
the police as an institution.

208. I will explore how internal police department structures can affect policing in one of
my future articles, tentatively titled “Police Procedural Justice.” See also Wesley G. Skogan
& Susan M. Hartnett, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 76 (1997) (describing how a
decentralized management program led to increased officer satisfaction and better working
relationships with the community).
209. Dan Horan, A Hunch, or the Whispered Voice of Experience?, 4. J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
13, 23 (2007).

